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Q UILICI AND SKLAR: ALTERNATIVE
MODELS FOR HANDGUN CONTROL
ORDINANCES
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of gun control provokes emotional reaction from both pro-
gun and gun control organizations. Gun owners believe that they have
a constitutional right to possess firearms. In contrast, gun control pro-
ponents emphasize the proliferation of handguns' and the role that
handguns play in violent crimes2 and accidental deaths3 as rationales
1. According to information compiled by the United States Department of Justice,
federally licensed firearms manufacturers produced 18,527,323 handguns between 1973
and 1981. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIsTIcs-1983, at 174 (1984). In his report to the United States
Senate, Gary Kleck of the Florida State School of Criminology wrote that the cumu-
lated stock of handguns was 46,994,951 as of 1978, and that 215 persons out of every
1,000 possessed a handgun. Handgun Control Legislation, 1982: Hearings Before the
Subcom. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
281 (1982) (statistical table by Gary Kleck).
2. Firearms, especially handguns, play an important role in violent crime.
MURDER VICTIMS
YEAR MURDER VICTIMS, GUNS
TOTAL Total Percent Percent
of Total Handguns
1980 21,860 13,650 62 46
1981 20,053 12,523 62 46
1982 19,485 11,721 60 43
1983 18,673 10,895 58 44
1984 16,689 9,819 59 44
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for regulating firearm possession.
Recently, Congress dealt gun control advocates a loss when amend-
ments to the Gun Control Act of 1968' liberalized restrictions on the
sale and transportation of firearms.5 In addition, courts have refused,
with one exception,6 to hold firearm manufacturers strictly liable for
injuries caused by their products.7
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL DATA BOOK &
GUIDE TO SOURCES: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1986, at 17 No.
290 (106th ed. 1986).
FIREARM USAGE IN SELECTED CRIMES
YEAR MURDER AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ROBBERY
1981 62.4 23.6 40.1
1982 60.2 22.4 39.9
1983 58.3 21.2 36.7
1984 58.8 21.1 35.8
Id. at 172 No. 292.
Firearms are tied with motor vehicles as the leading cause of death for persons aged
30-54 and the second leading cause of death, behind motor vehicles, for persons aged
15-34. Kotulak, Guns Closing in on Autos as No. 1 Cause of Death, Chicago Tribune,
June 9, 1985, § 6, at 4.
3. Firearms were responsible for 1756 accidental deaths in 1982, according to the
National Center for Health Statistics. Chicago Tribune, June 9, 1985, § 6, at 4. Every
day five persons are killed accidentally by guns. Id.
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-28 (1982). See generally Annotation, Validity, Construction,
and Application of Provisions of Gun ControlAct of 1968 and Implementing Regulations
Relating to Firearms Registration and Recording Requirements Imposed Upon Federally
Licensed Firearms Dealers, 33 A.L.R. FED. 824 (1977).
5. See Federal Firearms Law Reform Act of 1986 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-28
(1982). See also H.R. REP. No. 495, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
6. See Kelley v. R.G. Industries, 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985). The Mary-
land Court of Appeals held that manufacturers and sellers of "Saturday Night Special"
handguns are strictly liable to innocent victims shot during crimes. See also Reskin,
"Saturday Night Special" Sellers and Makers are Liable, 71 A.B.A. J. 98 (Dec. 1985);
West, Maryland's Highest Court Shoots Down Suppliers of Saturday Night Specials, I 1
LITIGATION NEWS 4 (Spring 1986); Comment, Kelley v. R.G Industries: Gun Control
Fires Back, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 493 (1986); Middleton, Court Finds Strict Liability for
Handgun, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 14, 1985, at 6, col. 4.
7. See, eg., Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984)
(held that under Illinois law, sale of handguns to the public is not an ultrahazardous
activity giving rise to strict liability); Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 127 Ill. App. 3d 676,
469 N.E.2d 339 (1984) (manufacturer of a nondefective firearm has no duty to prevent
its sale to persons likely to cause harm to the public); see also Note, Handguns and
Products Liability, 97 HARV. L. REv., 1912-28 (1984) (use of products liability against
firearm manufacturers is inappropriate).
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Unsuccessful in efforts to reduce firearm possession through federal
legislation or judicial action, many gun control groups are directing
their energies toward the passage of municipal gun control ordinances.
Not all efforts to enact local gun control ordinances have been success-
ful.' Local governments in Illinois, however, have enacted two distinct
gun control models. One model is a Chicago ordinance9 that regulates
handgun possession through registration requirements. The city hopes
to reduce the number of handgun deaths and injuries by restricting the
availability of handguns to a limited number of residents.10
Ordinances enacted by the Villages of Morton Grove1" and Oak
Park' z and the City of Evanston 3 that ban handgun possession evi-
dence the second gun control model. These municipalities also hope to
reduce handgun deaths and injuries by enacting the statutes.14
The purpose of this Note is not to advocate one position in the gun
control debate. Rather, the Note will analyze the validity of both mod-
els in the context of two Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals cases,
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove 5 and Sklar v. Byrne,16 which upheld
8. Massachusetts voters rejected efforts to ban handguns in their state. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 4, 1976, at 23, col. 3. The citizens of California rejected legislation that would
have frozen the number of firearms at its current level. Washington Post, Nov. 9, 1982,
at A6, col. 1. San Francisco successfully enacted a ban on handgun possession. SAN
FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE CODE art. 35, § 3503 (1982). In Doe v. City of San Fran-
cisco, 136 Cal. App. 3d 509, 186 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1982), however, the California Court of
Appeals found that the California Penal Code preempted the municipal ordinance, and
therefore declared the ordinance invalid. See infra notes 114-23 and accompanying text
(discussing preemption). See generally Mann, Handgun Prohibition: A Comparison of
the San Francisco and the Morton Grove Ordinances, 6 CRIM. JUs. J. 21 (1982); Com-
ment, Of Lawyers, Guns, and Money: Preemption and Handgun Control, 16 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 137 (1982) (identifies obstacles facing California city ordinances banning hand-
guns).
Other communities have enacted ordinances requiring homeowners to possess a
handgun. See Goreville, Ill., Ordinance 82-2 (Dec. 7, 1982) and Pittsburgh, Ill., Ordi-
nance 83-3 (June 6, 1983) (both ordinances require all resident heads of households,
with certain enumerated exceptions, to own a firearm with ammunition).
9. CHICAGO, ILL., CODE §§ 11.1-1 to -24 (1983).
10. Id. (preamble).
11. Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-11, § 2 (1981).
12. Oak Park, Ill., Ordinance Regulating the Possession of Firearms Commonly
Known as Handguns, § 2 (Apr. 16, 1984).
13. Evanston, II., Ordinance 22-0-82, § 1 (Oct. 4, 1982).
14. In Oak Park only one murder from 1982-85 involved a handgun. In Evanston
armed robbery has gradually decreased since 1982 when the ordinance was enacted.
Chicago Tribune, May 12, 1985, § 1, at 14, 16.
15. 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982).
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the Morton Grove and Chicago ordinances. In Parts II and III, the
Note reviews the right to bear arms clauses in both the United States
and the Illinois Constitutions. Part IV discusses Illinois home rule
power principles and state preemption. Next, the Note analyzes, in
Parts V-VII, gun control ordinances in the context of the Federal Con-
stitution's fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments. Finally, Parts
VIII-IX discuss the significance of Quilici and Sklar and present a
model handgun ordinance that will pass judicial scrutiny.
II. FEDERAL RIGHT To BEAR ARMS
In 1689, Parliament enacted the English Bill of Rights. 7 One provi-
sion stated that "the subjects which are protestants may have arms for
their defense.., and as allowed by law."' 8 In enacting this provision,
Parliament intended to guarantee Protestants a collective right to bear
arms to protect themselves should a later monarch maintain a large
Catholic army as James II had during the 1680s. 9 Although this pro-
vision ensured Protestants the right to serve in the army, it did not
guarantee them an individual right to possess firearms.2° Therefore,
when the colonists arrived in America, they brought with them merely
a collective right to bear arms.
A major political theme of the American Revolutionary era was mis-
trust of large standing national armies. 21 One cause of the Revolution-
ary War was the oppressive nature of British military rule, carried out
through its standing army.22 During this period, state constitutions
contained provisions guaranteeing the right to bear arms.23 These pro-
16. 727 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1984).
17. 7 W. & M., Sess. 2 (1689).
18. Id.
19. See Feller & Gotting, The Second Amendment, A Second Look, 61 Nw. U.L.
REv. 46, 48 (1966).
20. Id. See also Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical
Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 974 (1972) (detailed
study of right to bear arms in England and United States colonial period).
Feller and Gotting note that the phrase "as allowed by law" qualified the Protestants'
right to bear arms. Feller & Gotting, supra note 19, at 49. Parliament reserved power
to limit ownership of arms, which it did in the Firearms Act of 1937. Feller & Gotting,
supra note 19, at 49.
21. Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of the American Experience,
48 CHn[-] KENT L. REV. 148, 151 (1971).
22. Feller & Gotting, supra note 19, at 49-53. See also Weatherup, supra note 20, at
977.
23. Feller & Gotting, supra note 19, at 53-56; Levin, supra note 21, at 152-54.
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visions, however, were intended to preserve the existence of citizen mi-
litias, not to guarantee an individual right to bear arms.2 4
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 discussed the right to bear
arms issue in the context of whether the proposed national government
could maintain a standing army and what role state militias would
have in the new federalist system.25 The delegates, however, did not
discuss at length the individual's right to possess firearms.2 6 Although
the states ratified the Constitution in 1789, the issue of state militias
remained unresolved. Therefore, as part of the Bill of Rights, James
Madison drafted the second amendment.2 7 Madison intended the sec-
ond amendment to guarantee states the right to maintain a well-armed
militia, not to provide individuals the right to bear arms.28 Accord-
ingly, the second amendment only established a collective right of the
people to bear arms so that the states, through their militias, could
check the national standing army.
29
The Supreme Court has considered the second amendment in three
cases. In United States v. Cruikshank30 the Court did not address the
24. Feller & Gotting, supra note 19, at 52-53; Levin, supra note 21, at 153-54. But
see Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second
Amendment, 9 HARV. J. PUB. POL'Y 559 (1986). The author contends that by the
Eighteenth Century, the English tradition of individual armament had solidified into a
concept of individual ownership of arms as a specific political right. Id. at 587. This
perception of individual armament became linked to individual freedom in America
during the period leading to the Revolutionary War. Id. at 588-92. The American
colonists, as an extension of individual freedom, asserted a right of individual armament
and self-defense that they believed the British Declaration of Rights guaranteed. Id. at
589.
25. Ashman, Handgun Control by Local Government, 10 N. KY. L. REv. 97, 108
(1982) (author was attorney for Morton Grove, Ill.).
26. Id.
27. The second amendment states: "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the
security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II. See generally Annotation, Federal Constitution
Right to Bear Arms, 37 A.L.R. FED. 696 (1978).
28. Ashman, supra note 25, at 109; Feller & Gotting, supra note 19, at 61.
29. Ashman, supra note 25, at 109; Feller & Gotting, supra note 19, at 61; Caplan,
Right of the Individual to Bear Arms: A Recent Judicial Trend, 1982 DET. C.L. REV.
789 (second amendment guarantees an individual right to possess firearms); but see
Hardy, supra note 24 (second amendment intended to protect the individual right to
bear arms previously recognized by the British Declaration of Rights); Weiss, A Reply
to Advocates of Gun Control Law, 52 J. URB. L. 577 (1974) (second amendment guaran-
tees individuals absolute right to bear arms as a means to protect first amendment
rights).
30. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
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second amendment directly.3 The Court stated, however, that the sec-
ond amendment applied only to the federal government.32
The Court later confronted the right to bear arms issue in Presser v.
Illinois.33 In Presser the Court ruled that an Illinois law prohibiting
fraternal military groups drilling with firearms did not violate the sec-
ond amendment.34 The Court, reaffirming its Cruikshank position, as-
serted that the second amendment limited only federal firearm
regulations, not state regulations.35 The Court also held, however, that
the states could not prohibit citizens from possessing firearms if the
prohibition prevented the maintenance of the state's militia.36
Finally, fifty years later, in United States v. Miller,37 the Supreme
Court again addressed the scope of the second amendment. In Miller
the Court held that the National Firearms Act38 was constitutional.39
The Court reaffirmed that the purpose of the second amendment was
to assure the continuation of state militias.4" In addition, the Court
established a standard to determine which firearms the second amend-
31. The government alleged that defendants conspired to deprive two blacks of sev-
eral constitutional rights, including the right to bear arms. Id. at 548.
32. Id. at 553. The Court stated that the second amendment "is one of the amend-
ments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government
... ." Id.
Gun proponents have argued, however, that the fourteenth amendment due process
clause incorporates all rights protected by the first ten amendments of the Constitution
and makes them applicable to the states. The Supreme Court, in Adamson v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), rejected this theory. The Court stated that the framers of the
fourteenth amendment due process clause did not intend it to draw within its scope the
earlier amendments to the Constitution. Id. at 54. See Watson v. Jago, 588 F.2d 330
(6th Cir. 1977) (fifth amendment right to an indictment by a grand jury not applicable
to the states through fourteenth amendment).
33. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
34. See id. at 253-54.
35. See id. at 265.
36. Id. Because the petitioner in Presser was not a member of the state militia, the
Court concluded that the law did not prevent maintenance of the militia. Id. at 266.
37. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
38. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (current version at 26
U.S.C. §§ 5801-72 (1982)) [hereinafter NFA].
39. 307 U.S. at 183. The government claimed that the two defendants violated the
NFA by transporting a sawed-off shotgun across state lines without registering the
weapon. The defendants demurred, claiming that the NFA violated the second amend-
ment. The district court sustained the demurrer. See United States v. Miller, 26 F.
Supp. 1002, 1003 (W.D. Ark. 1939).
40. 307 U.S. at 178.
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ment protects. The Court stated that the second amendment does not
apply unless a weapon "has some reasonable relationship to the preser-
vation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia., 41 Lower federal courts
have subsequently followed the Miller court's standard.42
In Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove43 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals cited Presser" and Miller45 in holding the second amendment
inapplicable to Morton Grove's handgun ordinance.46 The court em-
phasized that the second amendment applied only to federal regula-
tions.4 7 The court concluded that the amendment did not guarantee an
individual right to bear arms.48
In Sklar v. Byrne49 the Seventh Circuit discounted the petitioner's
second amendment argument in one paragraph."0 The court relied on
its Quilici opinion to hold the second amendment inapplicable to state
and local governments.5 Because the asserted right to bear arms was
not integral to the exercise of other constitutionally protected rights,52
the court concluded that the registration ordinance did not violate any
federal right to bear arms.53
41. Id.
42. See, eg., Thomas v. Members of City Council, 730 F.2d 41 (Ist Cir. 1984) (city
officials did not violate applicant's constitutional rights in denying him a permit to carry
a concealed weapon); Sklar v. Bryne, 727 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1984) (handgun registra-
tion ordinance violated neither the second amendment nor the fourteenth amendment
equal protection clause); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir.
1982) (ordinance banning possession of handguns upheld as constitutional), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 863 (1984); United States v. Oaks, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977) (posses-
sion of unregistered machine gun not protected by second amendment purpose of
maintaining effectiveness of state militia), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United
States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
43. 695 F.2d 261 (7th cir. 1982).
44. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text for discussion of Presser.
45. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text for discussion of Miller.
46. 695 F.2d at 270.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 727 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 637.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
53. 727 F.2d at 637.
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III. RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS UNDER THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION
Although the second amendment does not guarantee individuals the
right to own and possess a gun, a majority of states have right to bear
arms provisions in their constitutions.54  Prior to 1970 the Illinois
Constitution did not guarantee an individual the right to own and pos-
sess handguns. Illinois courts, however, interpreted the state constitu-
tion as conferring a right to bear arms that was coextensive with that
provided by the second amendment . In 1970 Illinois adopted a new
constitution and added a right to bear arms provisions. Article I, sec-
tion 22 provides: "Subject only to the police power, the right of the
individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."56
Section 22 facially seems to guarantee an individual right to bear
arms. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, in Kalodimos v. Village of
Morton Grove,57 upheld Morton Grove's ordinance banning handgun
possession.5" After studying proceedings from the Illinois Constitu-
tional Convention of 1970, the supreme court concluded that section
54. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26; ARIZ. CONST. art.
II, § 26; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. I, § 13; CONN. CONsT art. I, § 15;
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1; HAw. CONST. art. I, § 15; IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 11; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22; IND. CONST. art. I, § 32; KAN. BILL OF
RIGHTS § 4; Ky. BILL OF RIGHTS § 1, para. 7; LA. CONST. art. I, § 11; MD. CONST. art.
I, § 16; MASS. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS pt. 1 art. XVIII; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6;
MISS. CONST. art. III, § 12; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12; N.M.
CONST. art. I, § 6; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4; OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 26; OR. CONST. art. I, § 27; PA. CONST. art. I, § 21; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 22;
S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 20; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 24; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26; TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 23; UTAH CONST. art. , § 6; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 16; VA. CONsT. art.
I, § 13; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 24.
The following states do not recognize a constitutional right to bear arms: California,
Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Nevada, North Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
55. In Brown v. City of Chicago, 42 Il. 2d 501, 250 N.E.2d 129 (1969), the Illinois
Supreme Court stated that a "regulation which does not impair the maintenance of the
state's active organized militia is not in violation of either the terms or the purposes of
the second amendment." Id. at 504, 250 N.E.2d at 131. See also Biffer v. City of Chi-
cago, 278 Ill. 562, 570, 116 N.E. 182, 183 (1917) (city ordinance regulating the sale and
ownership of firearms did not violate second amendment or state constitution).
56. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22.
57. 103 Ill. 2d 483, 470 N.E.2d 266 (1984).
58. Both the circuit court and court of appeals, 113 Ill. App. 3d 488, 447 N.E.2d
849 (1983), entered summary judgment in favor of the village. The appellants, residents
of Morton Grove, called upon the supreme court to define the scope of § 22 and deter-
mine whether the village violated state home rule provisions. See infra notes 82-128 and
accompanying text (discussing Illinois home rule power).
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22 does not mirror the second amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion. 9 Instead, the framers of section 22 meant to expand the right to
bear arms from a collective right to maintain a militia to an individual
right to bear certain firearms."
The framers of section 22, however, explicitly subjected the right to
bear arms to police power regulation.61 The convention delegates de-
termined that section 22 would not prevent the state or any municipal-
ity from banning handguns.62  The supreme court concluded that
section 22 prohibited only a ban on all firearms that an individual citi-
zen might use; a ban on certain categories of weapons such as hand-
guns was permissible.63
Decisions by Illinois appellate courts also support the qualified indi-
vidual right to bear arms. The Appellate Court of Illinois for the First
District twice upheld the validity of a state statute prohibiting the pos-
session of a loaded firearm in public." In People v. Wilkes6" the court
declared that the state may limit the right to carry or possess arms in
order to control crime.66 Three years later, in People v. Williams,67 the
court asserted that paragraph 24-1(a)(10)68 did not violate section 22 of
59. 103 Ill. 2d at 491, 470 N.E.2d at 209.
60. REPORT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS COMMITTEE ON THE PREAMBLE AND BILL
OF RIGHTS [hereinafter COMM. REPORT], 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLI-
NOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 87 (1970) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS]. See also
Kalodimos, 103 III. 2d at 491, 470 N.E.2d at 269. The court emphasized that § 22
created a right to possess a weapon for recreation or self-defense, regardless of its adapt-
ability for use in a state militia. 103 Ill. 2d at 499-500, 470 N.E.2d at 273.
61. See COMM. REPORT, 6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 60, at 88-89. See also
Kalodimos, 103 Ill. 2d at 491-92, 470 N.E.2d at 269.
62. Delegate Foster, who introduced section 22 to the convention, stated that "the
state would have the right to prohibit some classes of firearms, such as war weapons,
handguns, or some other category." 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 60, at 1687 (statement
of Delegate Foster). See also Kalodimos, 103 Ill. 2d at 494, 470 N.E.2d at 270-71.
63. 103 I11. 2d at 498, 470 N.E.2d at 272-73.
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, $ 24-1(a)(10) (1985). The statute states: "(a) A person
commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly: ... (10) Carries or
possesses on or about his person, upon any public street, alley, or other public lands...
any pistol, revolver, stungun or teaser or other firearm."
65. 31 111. App. 3d 902, 334 N.E.2d 910 (1975).
66. Id. at 905, 334 N.E.2d at 912. See also People v. Graves, 23 Ill. App. 3d 762,
320 N.E.2d 95 (1974) ( 24-1(a)(10) does not violate the fourteenth amendment equal
protection clause of the federal constitution or article IV, § 13 of the Illinois
Constitution).
67. 60 I11. App. 3d 726, 377 N.E.2d 285 (1978).
68. See supra note 64 for text of this paragraph.
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the Illinois Constitution because the statute was a mere regulation and
not a total prohibition against the use and possession of firearms.69
In Rawlings v. Department of Law Enforcement7 ° the Illinois Appel-
late Court for the Third District addressed the constitutionality of a
state statute requiring owners to obtain an identification card for their
weapons. 71 The court determined that promulgation of the statute was
a valid infringement on the individual right to bear arms. 72
In Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove 73 the Seventh Circuit held that
section 22 recognized an individual right to possess firearms.74 The
court found, however, that the police power of the state limited the
right to bear arms so that a total ban on handgun possession did not
violate section 22.7 ' The court held that section 22 merely prohibited a
69. 60 Ill. App. 3d at 728, 377 N.E.2d at 286-87. The court interpreted the numer-
ous exceptions to 24-1(a)(10) as evidence of legislative intent to merely regulate, but
not prohibit, firearm possession. For example, % 24-1(a)(10) allows a person to possess a
firearm in his home or place of business, and authorizes licensed hunters to carry weap-
ons while hunting. 60 Ill. App. 3d at 728, 377 N.E.2d at 287. In addition, the court
found that the statutory restrictions imposed by % 24-1(a)(10) were a reasonable and
necessary exercise of state police power as permitted by § 22. Id.
70. 73 Ill. App. 3d 267, 391 N.E. 2d 758 (1979).
71. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, % 83-2(a) (1985). The statute states: "(a) No person
may acquire or possess any firearm or any firearm ammunition within this State without
having in his possession a Firearm Owner's Identification Card previously issued in his
name by the Department of State Police under the provisions of this Act." Paragraph
83-2(b) sets forth exceptions to the above requirements for law enforcement personnel,
members of the armed forces and Illinois National Guard, and certain groups of
nonresidents.
72. 73 Ill. App. 3d at 274, 391 N.E.2d at 763. The court cited United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), and Brown v. Chicago, 42 Ill. 2d 501, 250 N.E.2d 129
(1969), in noting that the second amendment also did not guarantee a right to bear
arms. 73 Ill. App. 3d at 274, 391 N.E.2d at 763. The court held that the second amend-
ment protected arms that had a reasonable relationship to maintaining a well-regulated
militia. Id.
73. 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982).
74. Id. at 266. Because the court felt the plain meaning of § 22 was not clear, it
relied on the constitutional debates for guidance. Id. The court stated:
The debates indicate that the category of arms protected by section 22 is not lim-
ited to military weapons; the framers also intended to include those arms that
"law-abiding persons commonly employ[ed]" for "recreation or the protection of
persons and property." Handguns are undisputedly the type of arms commonly
used for "recreation or the protection of person and property."
Id. (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 267. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on two factors: (1) § 22
grants the right to bear firearms, not handguns; and (2) the framers of § 22 intended
handguns to be one of the arms conditionally protected under the section, but they also
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total ban of all firearms.76 Thus, although the court determined that
handguns were among the class of "arms" protected by section 22, it
concluded that section 22 permitted a municipality to ban a certain
category of "arms" such as handguns.77
Two years later, in Sklar v. Byrne,78 the Seventh Circuit relied on its
Quilici opinion to dismiss the petitioner's argument that section 22
guaranteed a right to bear arms. 7 9 The court asserted that the right to
bear arms was "narrow and subject to extensive regulation.""0 As a
result, the court concluded that Chicago's registration ordinance was
valid."1
IV. HOME RULE AND PREEMPTION IN ILLINOIS
Neither the Constitution's second amendment nor section 22 of the
Illinois Constitution bar local governments from enacting gun control
ordinances. Such an ordinance, however, must be a valid exercise of
the local government's home rule authority.82 This section of the Note
will discuss both the powers of and the limitations on Illinois home
rule units.
Prior to July 1, 1971,83 Illinois courts limited the statutory powers of
envisioned municipalities exercising their police power to restrict, or even prohibit, the
right to possess arms. Id.
76. Id. The court again relied on the constitutional debates surrounding § 22. The
court quoted one delegate as stating that § 22 "would prevent a complete ban on all
guns, but there could be a ban on certain categories." Id. (quoting Delgate Foster, 3
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 60, at 1693).
77. Id. at 266-67.
78. 727 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1984).
79. Id. at 637.
80. Id.
81. Id. The plaintiff in Sklar contended that the law violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment by discriminating against persons who own hand-
guns and have moved to Chicago after the effective date of the ordinance. Id. at 635.
See infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
Chicago's gun registration ordinance provides in pertinent part: "(a) All firearms
located in the City of Chicago shall be registered in accordance with the provisions of
this Chapter.... No person shall within the City of Chicago, shall [sic] possess, harbor,
have under his control . . .any firearm unless such person is the holder of a valid
registration certificate for such firearm." CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 11.1-2 (1983).
82. See generally Michael & Norton, Home Rule in Illinois: A Functional Analysis,
1978, U. ILL. L.F. 559 (studies regulatory power of home rule units).
83. July 1, 1971, was the effective date of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
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local governments by applying Dillon's Rule.84  Courts interpreted
home rule charters as a grant, rather than a limit, of power.8 5 The
state legislature controlled nearly all local government affairs. 86 Non-
home rule units are still subject to this policy;87 they need an express
state statutory grant of power before taking certain local actions.88
Article VII, section 6(a) of the 1970 Illinois Constitution8 9 was
designed to give home rule units broad power to act on matters of local
concern. 90 Section 6(a) provides that home rule powers will be granted
to communities with a population of more than 25,000 and to cities
with a lesser population that elect by referendum to become home rule
units. 91 Section 6(a) also provides that a home rule community can
84. See 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs 448 (5th ed. 1911). See also Mar-
shall Field & Co. v. Village of South Barrington, 92 Ill. App. 3d 360, 415 N.E.2d 1277
(1981) (under Dillon's Rule, legislative grants of authority are to be strictly construed).
See generally D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCH & P. SALSICH, STATE AND LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSrEM, 83-85 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter D. MANDELKER].
85. See City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101, 112-13, 421 N.E.2d 196,
201-02 (1981); D. MANDELKER, supra note 84, at 83-84.
86. See ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 34 and art. IX, § 9. See also Village of
Westville v. Rainwater, 294 Ill. 409, 128 N.E. 492 (1920) (city lacked authority to re-
quire licensing of softdrink wholesalers).
87. ILL. CONsT. art. VII, § 7. The section reads in part: "Counties and municipali-
ties which are not home rule units shall have only powers granted to them by law and
the powers," to make local improvements, change their form of government and pro-
vide for their officers manner of selection and terms of office. Id. See Jacobsen v. State
Liquor Control Comm'n, 97 Ill. App. 3d 700, 423 N.E.2d 531 (1981).
88. See Geneva Residential Ass'n, Ltd. v. City of Geneva, 100 Ill. App. 3d 413, 426
N.E.2d 564 (1981) (state legislation limits local use of "special use" zoning permits);
Village of Cherry Valley v. Schuelke, 46 Ill. App. 3d 91, 360 N.E.2d 158 (1977) (state
legislation does not preempt field of traffic regulations).
Municipalities may exercise their police powers concurrently with the state, as long as
their statutes are consistent with state legislation. See Brown v. City of Chicago, 42 111.
2d 501, 250 N.E.2d 129 (1969) (city gun regulation ordinances upheld); Kizer v. City of
Mattoon, 332 IIl. 545, 164 N.E. 20 (1928) (city ordinance regulating storage and sale of
petroleum held invalid). See also 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. S-1186 (municipalities may enact
ordinances regulating conduct also regulated by the state criminal code). Ordinances,
however, that directly or indirectly prohibit actions authorized by state legislation are
invalid. See Arrington v. City of Chicago, 45 Ill. 2d 316, 259 N.E.2d 22 (1970) (to the
extent that a municipal ordinance regulating firearms conflicted with state statutes, or-
dinance held invalid).
89. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
90. See 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 60, at 1621.
91. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a). See also Wes Ward Enter., Ltd. v. Andrews, 42 Ill.
App. 3d 458, 355 N.E.2d 131 (1975) (Illinois constitutional provision that grants home
rule powers does not violate equal protection clause).
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exercise any power pertaining to its government and affairs, including,
but not limited to, the power to regulate for the public health, safety
and welfare.
92
In addition, section 6(i) permits home rule units to exercise concur-
rently with the state93 any power, unless the state legislature specifi-
cally preempts local government action.94 The Illinois Supreme Court
has interpreted section 6(i) to require an explicit limitation by the state
legislature.95 Finally, section 6(m) provides that home rule unit pow-
ers should be construed liberally.
96
Although home rule units generally have broad powers, section 6
92. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
93. See Easter Enter., Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 114 Il. App. 3d 885,
449 N.E.2d 1013 (1983) (liquor control subject to concurrent jurisdiction between state
and local governments).
94. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(i).
95. A state statute must contain an express statement of preemption, otherwise
home rule units retain all their police powers. In Rozner v. Korshak, 55 Inl. 2d 430, 303
N.E.2d 389 (1973), the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a Chicago wheel tax as a consti-
tutional exercise of home rule powers. Id. at 436, 303 N.E.2d at 392. The court created
an "express statement" requirement for legislative restriction of home rule authority.
Id. at 435, 303 N.E.2d at 392. Because the court found no express language in the
statute indicating a legislative intent to limit or deny home rule authority, it held that
the statute had no restrictive effect on home rule units. The Illinois Supreme Court
later maintained Rozner's express statement requirement. See, eg., Leck v. Michaelson,
129 Ill. App. 3d 593, 472 N.E.2d 1166 (1984); City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill.
2d 101, 108, 421 N.E.2d 196, 199 (1981) ("The enactment of a statute after the effective
date of the 1970 Constitution does not automatically render the area one of exclusive
control by the state.., or deny home rule units the power to act .... The statute must
contain an express statement to that effect."); Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 InI. 2d
523, 528, 343 N.E.2d 919, 923 (1976) (statute intended to limit or deny home rule
powers must contain an express statement to that effect); Peters v. City of Springfield,
57 111. 2d 142, 311 N.E.2d 107 (1974).
In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 437, 439, 362 N.E.2d 1021, 1022
(1977), the Illinois Supreme Court held that the following statute expressly preempted
home rule authority for insurance company regulations:
It is declared to be the public policy of this State, pursuant to paragraphs (h) and
(i) of Section 6 of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, that any power or
function set forth in this Act to be exercised by the State is an exclusive State
power or function. Such power or function shall not be exercised concurrently,
either directly or indirectly, by any unit of local government, including home rule
units, except as otherwise provided in this Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, 2.1 (1985).
96. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(m). See 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 60, at 1621. See
also Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (§ 6 establishes
presumption in favor of municipal home role).
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limits these powers in three ways.9 7 First, section 6(a) permits home
rule units to exercise only those powers related to their "government
and affairs."9 8 Second, section 6(d) restricts the power of home rule
units to incur debt or to provide for punishment of a felony.9 9 Third,
section 6(i) permits the state legislature to preempt concurrent local
governmental power."° If the home rule power is granted to the local
government under section 6, however, and if the state does not exercise
this power, then section 6(g) requires a three-fifths majority vote of the
state legislature to limit the home rule unit's power.101
Section 6(a) prohibits home rule municipalities from acting on mat-
ters of exclusive state concern. In Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley 2 the
county required the collection of a county law library fee when filing a
civil action.1"3 The Illinois Supreme Court found the fee unconstitu-
tional because it infringed on the administration of justice, which was a
matter of state wide concern and did not pertain to local government
affairs.1" The Illinois Supreme Court has also struck down local ordi-
nances regulating state wide matters such as the environment,10 5
branch banking,10 6 private detectives,1"7 and public utilities."0 8
97. See Michael & Norton, supra note 82, at 564.
98. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a). See Board of Educ. v. City of Peoria, 76 Ill. 2d
469, 394 N.E.2d 399 (1979) (construction of phrase "pertaining to its government and
affairs" is a matter for courts to determine).
99. ILL. CONsT. art. VII, § 6(d).
100. Id § 6(i). See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. ILL. CONST. art. VII,
§ 6(j), (k) permit the Illinois legislature to limit the amount of debt a home rule unit
may incur. See generally Helman & Whaten, Constitutional Commentary, ILL. ANN.
STAT. CONST. art. VII (Smith-Hurd 1981); see, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95 '/2 I1-
208.2 (1985).
101. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(g). See City of Rockford v. Gill, 75 Ill. 2d 334, 388
N.E.2d 384 (1979).
102. 61111. 2d 537, 338 N.E.2d 15 (1975).
103. Id. at 538, 338 N.E.2d at 16.
104. Id. at 542, 338 N.E.2d at 18.
105. See City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 65 Ill. 2d 1, 357 N.E.2d 433
(1976) (home rule units are not authorized to regulate regional or state-wide environ-
mental problems). But see Cook County v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 Ill. 2d 494,
389 N.E.2d 553 (home rule units may legislate concurrently with state if local legisla-
tion not preempted), aff'd on remand, 86 Ill. App. 3d 673, 408 N.E.2d 236 (1979).
106. People ex rel. Lignoul v. City of Chicago, 67 Ill. 2d 480, 368 N.E.2d 100 (1977)
(banking held to be predominantly a state and national government matter).
107. United Private Detective & See. Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 62 Ill. 2d 506, 343
N.E.2d 453 (1976) (state statute preempted home rule regulation of private detectives).
108. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co. v. City of Chicago, 125 Il. App. 3d 95, 465
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Gun control legislation, however, is not a matter of exclusive state
concern. When writing the 1970 constitution, section 22's framers con-
templated local governments enacting gun control ordinances for pub-
lic safety and welfare reasons."° In addition, Illinois courts have
recognized the authority of home rule units to pass legislation super-
seding related state statutes enacted prior to the 1970 Constitution. 1 0
The Illinois Supreme Court determined in Brown v. City of Chicago
that local governments possess the requisite police powers to enact
handgun legislation.1 11 Finally, in Kalodimos v. Village of Morton
Grove the supreme court held that weapons control and crime preven-
tion were not matters of strictly state wide concern.1 12 The court
found that local governments had important interests in regulating
weapon possession to reduce premeditated crime, domestic violence,
and accidental firearm deaths within their boundaries.
113
Because local governments possess sufficient home rule power to en-
act gun control ordinances, the only other limit to passage of these
ordinances is preemption by state law. Section 6(a) grants home rule
units the same police power to regulate for protection of the public
health, safety, and welfare as the state, except when the state legislature
specifically limits" 4 local government powers. 1 5 In Rozner v. Kor-
shak 1 6 the Illinois Supreme Court established an express statement
N.E.2d 603 (1984) (long standing statewide interest in public utilities, manifested by
state commerce commission's exclusive regulation, precludes local regulations).
109. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (discussing state constitutional
history of right to bear arms).
110. See Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 Ill. 2d 523, 527, 343 N.E.2d 919, 922,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 832 (1976); Resman v. Personnel Bd., 96 Ill. App. 3d 919, 422
N.E.2d 120 (1981) (personnel ordinance upheld); Springfield v. Ushman, 71 Ill. App. 3d
112, 388 N.E.2d 1357 (1979) (tax ordinance for sale of fireworks upheld).
The Illinois Supreme Court has also validated home rule ordinances that conflict with
state statutes enacted prior to the 1970 constitution. See, eg., City of Evanston v.
Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101, 421 N.E.2d 196 (1981) (local ordinance regulating landlord-
tenant relations upheld); Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 Ill. 2d 544, 338 N.E.2d 6 (1975)
(county liquor tax sustained).
111. 42 11. 2d 501, 250 N.E.2d 129 (1969). See supra note 55 and accompanying
text.
112. 103 Ii. 2d 483, 503, 470 N.E.2d 266, 275 (1984).
113. Id.
114. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(g)-(i). See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
115. See City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101, 115, 421 N.E.2d 196, 201
(1981); City of Urbana v. Houser, 67 Ill. 2d 268, 273, 367 N.E.2d 692, 694 (1977).
116. 55 III. 2d 430, 303 N.E.2d 389 (1973).
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requirement to preempt home rule authority by state statute. 117 It has
been argued that the state legislature, through enactment of numerous
statutes, has preempted home rule power to regulate firearms. 118 The
Illinois Supreme Court in Brown, however, specifically stated that "the
legislature has not preempted the field of gun control."' 1 9
The supreme court, in Kalodimos, determined that state firearm reg-
ulations did not preempt stricter legislation by municipalities. 2 '
Rather, state statutes expressly permit more stringent local regula-
tions."' Chapter 38, paragraph 83-13.1 of the Firearms and Ammuni-
tion Act provides that any local controls more stringent than
regulations imposed by the Act are unaffected by the Act. 122 The
court, therefore, concluded that Morton Grove properly exercised its
home rule powers in enacting its ordinance.123
The Quilici court stated that Illinois home rule units have expansive
powers, "including the authority to impose greater restrictions on par-
ticular rights than those imposed by the state." 1 24 The court con-
cluded that because the Illinois Constitution permitted a ban on certain
categories of arms,125 home rule units could enact gun control legisla-
tion differing from, or even inconsistent with, state statutory restric-
tions. 1 26 The Seventh Circuit, in Sklar v. Byrne,127 determined that
117. Id. at 435, 303 N.E.2d at 392. See supra note 95 for a discussion of Rozner.
118. Judge Coffey, in his Quilici dissent, stated that home rule gun control ordi-
nances were "impliedly preempted" by an "extensive scheme" of firearm statutes. 695
F.2d 261, 271-73 (1982) (Coffey, J., dissenting).
Judge Coffey cited five statutes as evidence of legislative intent to preempt the gun
control field. The first was ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, 24-3.1, which prohibits posses-
sion of a firearm by a minor, a felon, a drug addict, or a mentally ill or retarded person.
The second statute, ILL. Rav. STAT., ch. 38, 24-1(a)(10), forbids possession of a hand-
gun by a person on a public street, alley, or other public lands. The third statute, ILL.
REV. STAT., ch. 38, 24-1(a)(4), proscribes carrying a concealed handgun. The fourth
statute, ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, % 24-1(a)(8) prohibits firearm possession in an estab-
lishment licensed to sell liquor. In the last statute Judge Coffey referred to, ILL. REV.
STAT., ch. 38, t 24-1(a)(7), the legislature expressly banned possession of firearms such
as machine guns and sawed-off shotguns, but did not categorically limit possession of
handguns. Id.
119. 42 Ill. 2d 501, 504, 250 N.E.2d 129, 131 (1969).
120. Kalodimos, 103 Ill. 2d at 506, 470 N.E.2d at 276.
121. Id.
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, % 83-13.1.
123. 103 Ill. 2d at 508, 470 N.E.2d at 277.
124. 695 F.2d 261, 268 (7th Cir. 1982).
125. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
126. 695 F.2d at 268.
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because the section 22 right to bear arms was a qualified right, subject
to police power regulation, a home rule unit could restrict the availabil-
ity of firearms.
128
V. FIFrH AMENDMENT
The fifth amendment of the Federal Constitution prohibits govern-
mental taking of private property without just compensation.1 29 States
can regulate private property for the public good without paying com-
pensation if they do not unreasonably infringe on property rights.1
30
Should a state regulation interfere with a property owner's rights to the
extent that a court considers the regulation a taking, the fifth amend-
ment will apply.13' Gun owners have argued that gun control legisla-
tion is a regulatory "taking" of private property. 132 Courts, however,
disagree.
Although one commentator has noted that no general rule exists
describing what constitutes a taking, 133 courts predominantly use the
127. 727 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1984).
128. Id. at 637.
129. The fifth amendment states in relevant part: "[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally
F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & G. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973); D.
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW (1982).
130. A state may use its police power to restrict private property uses for the protec-
tion of public health, safety, and welfare. See, eg., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (local zoning ordinance forbidding industry in a residential
area upheld as a valid exercise of the police power); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922) (state statute restricting mining that caused subsidence of surface
dwellings upheld). See generally Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36
(1964) (reviews regulations that courts have considered takings); Comment, State Regu-
lation of Substandard Housing and the Fifth Amendment Taking Clause: Devines v.
Maier, 20 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 263 (1985) (reviews history of taking
clause in context of tenants' leasehold interests).
131. The fifth amendment taking clause applies to states through the fourteenth
amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897).
Courts no longer require an actual physical invasion of private property by the state
to invoke fifth amendment protections. Compare Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 166 (1871) (taking occurred when state-built public dam flooded claimant's
land) with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
132. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1183-84 (N.D. Ill.
1981).
133. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 483 (2d ed.
1982) [hereinafter J. NOWAK].
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"continuum theory" '134 established by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon. 3 ' Justice Holmes stated that courts should use a
balancing test to determine whether a government regulation is a tak-
ing. 36 Justice Holmes compared the public need and the diminution in
value of the property owner's land.137 The property owner receives no
compensation if the public benefit outweighs his injuries. 138
While following Justice Holmes' continuum theory, many courts use
criteria other than the diminution formula to determine whether a tak-
ing exists. 139 For example, the district court in Quilici v. Village of
Morton Grove analyzed the availability of alternative uses after enact-
ment of the regulation." As long as the regulation leaves the property
owner some reasonable use of his land, courts following this approach
will not find a taking. 4
The petitioner in Sklar did not raise the fifth amendment issue. Such
a claim would have been unsuccessful because the Seventh Circuit de-
termined that Chicago's ordinance was a reasonable exercise of police
powers. 142 In addition, the ordinance did not destroy the owner's use
of his weapons. He could store and enjoy them outside of Chicago, or
sell them to a non-Chicago resident. The ordinance merely prohibited
ownership of a gun within the Chicago city limits.
134. See Gordon, Compensable Regulatory Taking: A Tollbooth Rises on Regulation
Road, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 211, 214 (1984); Comment, supra note 130, at 267-68.
135. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
136. Id. at 415-16. A court should weigh the regulation's public benefit against the
property owner's injury. Id. See also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)
(Court used balancing test to uphold zoning ordinance).
137. Justice Holmes applied a "diminution in value" test to measure the property
owner's injury. 260 U.S. at 413. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 129, at 21-22. Com-
ment, supra note 130, at 260 and n.36.
138. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(city ordinance prohibiting the building of a high-rise office building upheld; aesthetic
benefit outweighed injury).
139. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. Rtv. 1165, 1183-84 (discusses
tests courts use to find a taking; describes four factors critical to finding of a taking).
140. 532 F. Supp. at 1183-84. "In order for a regulatory taking to require compen-
sation.., the exercise of the police power must result in the destruction of the use and
enjoyment of a legitimate private property right." Id. See also Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning ordinance restricting land to residential
use upheld even though it reduced value of land by 75%).
141. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 (zoning ordinance permitted "reasonable
beneficial use" of the landmark site).
142. 727 F.2d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 1984).
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VI. NINTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court has recognized certain rights as "fundamen-
tal." 143 The Court has determined that these rights are so necessary to
the exercise of individual liberty that the ninth amendment 144 protects
them, even though the Bill of Rights does not expressly list them in the
first eight amendments. 145 The Court has never clearly delineated the
scope of the ninth amendment. The Court, however, has limited the
scope of fundamental rights to those concerning interstate travel, the
family, and procreation.1 46
143. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 140 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(marital privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (child
rearing and education).
144. The ninth amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. IX.
145. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
146. See generally Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69
VA. L. REv. 223 (1983); Ely, Forward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV.
L. REv. 5 (1978).
Since Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), the Supreme Court has protected
values that a majority of the Court believes are essential to an ordered society, although
such rights are not expressly enumerated in the Constitution. The Justices often advo-
cate natural law principles as support for their position. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (Marshall and Johnson opinions). In Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme Court declared that a state labor law violated the
Constitution by overly interfering with employer-employee contract rights. Id. at 64.
During the 30 years subsequent to the Lochner decision, the Court invalidated on sub-
stantive due process grounds a number of economic-related laws. See, e.g., Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (law prescribing minimum wages for women
held to violate due process); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (law prohibiting
nonunion membership clauses in contracts held to violate due process clause); but see
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (law prescribing maximum work hours for wo-
men upheld).
In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), the Supreme Court rejected
its interventionist approach to substantive due process. The Court overturned Adkins v.
Children's Hospital and sustained a state law establishing minimum wages for women.
The Court emphasized that the freedom of contract is not an absolute right. The Court
stated that the Constitution prohibited the deprivation of liberty but "does not recog-
nize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty .... [The liberty safeguarded is liberty in a
social organization which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace
the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people." Id. at 391. Later, the Court, in
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), expressly stated that it would no
longer intervene in cases concerning economic legislation. Id. at 488. By rejecting the
Lochner approach to substantive due process, however, the Supreme Court limited the
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In Griswold v. Connecticut 147 the Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction of planned parenthood clinic personnel who had violated a state
statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to any person. The
Court found a fundamental right to marital privacy.1 48 In his concur-
rence, Justice Goldberg established a standard to determine which
rights not expressed explicitly in the first eight amendments were fun-
damental rights protected by the ninth amendment. 149 He found only
those rights "so rooted' in the "traditions and [collective] conscience"
of American citizens to be fundamental.15
ability of justices to use natural law and subjective factors to define and protect
unenumerated constitutional rights.
Notwithstanding the Court's noninterventionist policy concerning economic legisla-
tion cases, the Court today continues to protect privileges that fall under the general
category of "right to privacy." See Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REv. 193 (1898) (argued that every individual has a cognizable legal interest in phys-
ical and emotional privacy). The Constitution, however, does not explicitly guarantee a
right to privacy. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, found that the "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees . . . . Various guarantees
- create zones of privacy." Id. at 484. Justice Douglas stated that the "penumbras" of
the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments create a right of privacy. Id.
Justice Goldberg, in his concurrence, found a fundamental right to privacy without
relying on any specific guarantee of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 486-87. He looked to the
ninth amendment as a source from which other liberties besides those not enumerated
in the first eight amendments could be found. Id. at 490. Justice Goldberg believed that
the ninth amendment did not create these additional rights, but rather authorized the
court to identify and protect them. Id. at 492-93. Justice Goldberg also established a
standard to identify fundamental rights, stating that a court should look to the "tradi-
tions and [collective] conscience" of America to determine whether such rights are "so
rooted" as to be "ranked as fundamental." Id. at 493. Applying this standard, Justice
Goldberg found a fundamental right to privacy. See 381 U.S. at 494. See generally J.
NowAK, supra note 133, at 737-39.
The Court has never defined the scope of the right to privacy. The Court indicated,
however, in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977), that the right to
privacy includes matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela-
tionships, and child rearing and education. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (statute
prohibiting interracial marriages held unconstitutional); Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (zoning ordinance so narrowly drawn as to disallow
grandchildren to live with their grandmother held unconstitutional); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (conviction under a statute banning the distribution of con-
traceptives held unconstitutional); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (statute
providing for compulsory sterilization after third conviction of a felony involving moral
turpitude held unconstitutional).
147. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
148. Id. at 484.
149. Id at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring). See supra note 146.
150. Id.
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Gun proponents argue that ancient scholars151 and the Framers of
the Bill of Rights acknowledged that a right to bear arms existed. 52 In
Quilici the petitioner cited Justice Goldberg's fundamental rights stan-
dard in asserting that the ninth amendment protected an unenumer-
ated right to possess handguns.15 3 The district court rejected this
argument, emphasizing that a majority of the Supreme Court has never
adopted Justice Goldberg's thesis. 54 The Seventh Circuit dismissed
the petitioner's ninth amendment argument for lacking "legal signifi-
cance," 155 pointing out that the Supreme Court had never held that the
ninth amendment protected any specific right. 56 The petitioner in
Sklar did not raise the ninth amendment issue.
VII. EQUAL PROTECTION
The Chicago handgun registration ordinance presented an additional
constitutional hurdle. Unlike Morton Grove's statute, the Chicago
statute classified residents differently-only some could keep their
handguns. The petitioner in Sklar argued that the Chicago ordinance
violated the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.15 7 The
151. Cicero wrote, "if our lives are endangered by plots or violence or armed rob-
bers or enemies, any and every method of protecting ourselves is morally right." Cic-
ero, In Defense of Titus Annius Milo, SELECTED POLITICAL SPEECHES 222 (M. Grant
trans. 1969) (quoted in Quilici, 532 F. Supp. at 1183).
152. But see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
153. 532 F. Supp. at 1183.
154. Id.
155. 695 F.2d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 1982). The Quilici dissent concluded that the ninth
amendment protected the right to possess handguns. Id. at 278-80. Judge Coffey ar-
gued that the Morton Grove ordinance violated two fundamental rights: the fundamen-
tal right to privacy and the fundamental right to defend the home against unlawful
intrusion. Id. at 279. Judge Coffey relied on Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
In Stanley the Supreme Court held that the first and fourteenth amendments prevent
states from criminalizing possession of obscene materials within the confines of a private
home. Stanley does not, however, create a general right of privacy in one's own home,
as the Court expressly limited the holding by declaring that the state had the power to
make possession of other items such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods a crime. Id.
at 568 n. 11. Stanley, therefore, offers little support for the position that one's privacy
right guarantees possession of handguns.
In addition, the Supreme Court has not yet recognized a fundamental right to defend
one's home. See supra note 146 for a discussion of recognized fundamental rights.
Thus, Judge Coffey's argument that the ninth amendment guarantees such a right is
incorrect.
156. 695 F.2d at 271.
157. 727 F.2d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 1984). The fourteenth amendment equal protec-
tion clause states in part: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall... deny
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petitioner argued that the classification was suspect because it discrimi-
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. See generally Tussman & Tenbroeck, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALiF. L. REV. 341 (1949) (statutes that are either underinclusive or overin-
clusive are unconstitutional).
The equal protection clause guarantees that those similarly situated are similarly
treated. Legislative classifications are not per se unconstitutional, "but the classification
must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." F.S. Royster Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See generally J. NoWAK, supra note 133, at 586-90.
The Supreme Court uses a two-tier analysis to decide equal protection claims. See J.
NoWAK, supra note 133, at 590-92. See also Developments in the Law-Equal Protec-
tion, 82 HARv. L. Rlv. 1065 (1969). The Court uses a deferential rational relation test
in cases involving economic legislation. The Court upholds the classification unless no
reasonable set of facts could establish a "rational relation" between a "legitimate" gov-
ernmental goal and the classification. See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331 (1981)
(Surface Mining and Reclamation Control Act of 1977 upheld against claims that land
use restrictions were arbitrary); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166 (1980) (congressional elimination of dual pension payments upheld); Baldwin v.
Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (state law charging nonresident hunters
higher fee for license than residents upheld). Professor Gunther describes "old" equal
protection as having "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact." Gunther,
The Supreme Court 1971 Term - Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
The Court's second standard of review is the strict scrutiny test. The Court will not
defer to other branches of government, but will determine independently whether the
legislative means are "necessary" to attain a "compelling" state interest. Gunther
stated that this standard of review "was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Id.
A court invokes strict scrutiny when it reviews legislative classifications that create a
"suspect" classification. Classifications based on race, national origin and, sometimes,
alienage are "suspect." See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (statute condi-
tioning distribution of welfare benefits on possession of United States citizenship held to
violate equal protection clause: "classifications based on alienage, like those passed on
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny"); Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (statute prohibiting interracial marriages held to vio-
late equal protection clause); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(World War II incarceration of Japanese-Americans; originated phrase "suspect"). But
see Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (statute excluding aliens from state police
force upheld: "right to govern is reserved to citizens").
Justice Stone's Carolene Products footnote 4 provides guidance for when a classifica-
tion is suspect, thereby invoking heightened scrutiny. United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Although the case did not raise the issue of
strict scrutiny review, Justice Stone stated that "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation to
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id. Courts have an
important function to protect "discrete and insular minorities" because they often can-
not protect themselves through the political process. J. NoWAK, supra note 133, at 592.
The Supreme Court also has invoked the strict scrutiny standard of review for classi-
fications interfering with the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right. See supra
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nated against new residents."' 8 Petitioner claimed that the ordinance
classified people unconstitutionally on the basis of durational residence
requirements' 59 that penalize the exercise of the right to travel." ° The
note 146 and accompanying text. For example, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to
laws limiting access to the political process and those interfering with the right to travel.
See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (statute restricting
vote in school district elections to persons either owning or leasing taxable property or
parents of school children held unconstitutional); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (statute conditioning receipt of state medical benefits upon a one-year residency
requirement held unconstitutional); see infra note 160 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing right to travel).
Although the Burger Court maintained the two-tier analysis, it expressed dissatisfac-
tion over the sharp differences between the rational basis test and the strict scrutiny test.
G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 589 (11th ed. 1985). As a result, the Court
developed an intermediate standard of review, applicable to classifications based on gen-
der. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (state statute that permitted sale of beer to
18 year old women but not to males under 21 years old held unconstitutional). The
classification must be "substantially related" to an "important" state objective. Id. at
197. Occasionally, the Supreme Court has applied heightened scrutiny to illegitimacy
classifications. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (statute requiring illegiti-
mate children to bring a paternity suit to identify their natural father before the age of
one or lose right to obtain child support held unconstitutional). But see Lalli v. Lalli,
439 U.S. 259 (1978) (statute prohibiting inheritance by illegitimate children from their
natural father unless a court made a finding of paternity during the father's lifetime
upheld).
158. 727 F.2d at 636.
159. Id. at 638. Durational residence requirements premise governmental services
and benefits on length of citizenship. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. 250, 263 (1974) (state statute requiring one year residence in county before public
hospital must provide free medical care held to burden right to travel). See generally
Comment, Durational Residence Requirements and the Equal Protection Clause: Zobel
v. Williams, 25 WASH. U.J. URn. & CONTEMP. L. 329 (1983).
160. A fundamental right to travel has been recognized since the founding of the
United States. The Articles of Confederation explicitly recognized the right to travel.
They stated that every citizen had the right of "Free ingress and regress to and from any
other State." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (1778), reprinted in 1 U.S.C.
XXXIX-XLVII (1982). The Constitution, however, contains no similar provision. The
Constitution provides only that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
It is unclear why both the Constitution and Bill of Rights excluded a right to travel
provision. One theory is that the Framers felt other provisions of the Constitution pro-
tected the right, namely Congress' commerce power and the article IV privileges and
immunities clause. See J. NOWAK, supra note 133, at 807; Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION of 1787, at 185 (1956).
Courts initially relied on the privileges and immunities clause to protect the right to
travel. In Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), the Court
interpreted the privileges and immunities clause as a protection of "[t]he right of a
citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade,
agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise." Id. at 552. But see New York v. Miln,
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Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that Chicago's ordinance was not a
durational residence requirement and only indirectly affected the right
to travel. 161
In Shapiro v. Thompson 162 the Supreme Court invalidated two Dis-
trict of Columbia statutes that denied welfare benefits to persons who
had resided less than a year in the District.163 The Court found that
because the residency requirement deterred transients from entering
the district, the statutes violated the equal protection clause by unduly
limiting the right to interstate travel.164 Because the Court held the
36 U.S. 102 (1837) (law prohibiting unwanted aliens from entering the state upheld).
See generally Berger, Residence Requirements for Welfare and Voting: A Post-Mortem,
42 OHIo ST. L.J. 853 (1981).
The Supreme Court, however, limited New York v. Miln twelve years later in The
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (2 How.) 283 (1849). There, the Court held that a state tax
imposed on incoming aliens implicated the commerce clause and was therefore invalid.
Since The Passenger Cases, the Supreme Court often has invoked the commerce clause
to protect the right to travel. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Helson v.
Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875).
The Supreme Court, however, never abandoned its theory of the right to travel. In
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867), the Supreme Court held that there is
an inherent right to travel. Id. at 44. Even when The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, limited the scope of the privileges and immunities clause, the Court con-
tinued to recognize the right to travel as one attribute of national citizenship. Id. at 79.
See also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (right to interstate travel incident
to federal citizenship); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920) (art. IV, § 2 of
Articles of Confederation, guaranteeing right to travel, similar to the article IV privi-
leges and immunities clause); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900) (right to travel is
"an attribute of personal liberty" guaranteed by the Constitution and fourteenth amend-
ment); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871) (privileges and immunities
clause is the source of the right to travel). See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 133, at
807.
Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has relied on the fourteenth amendment equal
protection clause to protect the right to travel. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 617
(1969), the Supreme Court declared invalid a statute that conditioned receipt of state
medical benefits upon a one year residence requirement. The statute's classification
scheme violated the equal protection clause because it treated new residents dissimi-
larly, id. at 631, and the government lacked a compelling interest. Id. at 634. For a
discussion of the equal protection clause, see supra note 157. For a discussion of Sha-
piro and similar cases, see infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
161. 727 F.2d at 638. Petitioner moved to Chicago from Skokie, Illinois. The court
of appeals noted that petitioner premised his argument on the federal constitutional
protection of intrastate movement. Id. at 638 n.7. In Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 & n.9, the Supreme Court expressly left unanswered the
question of whether the federal constitution protected intrastate travel.
162. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See supra note 160 for discussion of the right to travel.
163. Id. at 642.
164. Id. at 631.
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right to interstate travel fundamental, it applied strict scrutiny to inval-
idate the statute.'
65
Later decisions have followed the Shapiro court's analysis of dura-
tional residence requirements. 166 The Court has indicated, however,
that it will uphold a residence requirement that limits travel as long as
it is not arbitrary.' 67 In addition, one commentator has noted that the
Court might uphold, under a deferential standard of review, a resi-
dence requirement that relates to activities not related to the exercise of
other rights or the new resident's ability to function in the
community.
1 6 8
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Sklar properly dismissed
petitioner's suspect classification argument. The Court noted that the
Chicago ordinance did not single out new residence to Chicago.
169
165. Id. at 634. The court stated that "any classification which serves to penalize
the exercise of... [a constitutional] right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Id. (emphasis in original).
166. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (Alaskan dividend distribution plan
based on number of years citizen resided in the state held unconstitutional); Memorial
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (Arizona statute that denied medical
services to indigents residing in the state less than one year held unconstitutional as
"penalizing" the right to travel); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (Tennessee
one-year residence requirement for voting held invalid as "penalizing" the right to
travel).
167. See Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981). Georgia law made a parent's wilful
abandonment of a child a misdemeanor. If the parents left the state, the abandonment
was a felony. In Jones the Court recognized a fundamental right to travel. Id. at 418.
The Court, however, found that a state may burden a citizen's right to travel if criminal
conduct within the state has qualified that right. Id. at 419. But cf Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393 (1975) (one-year residence requirement for bringing divorce proceedings up-
held because no deprivation of court access occurs, merely a delay).
The Supreme Court has also recognized the validity of bona fide residence require-
ments. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983). The Court upheld a state statute
that denied free education to a student who lived apart from his parents or legal guard-
ian if the student's main reason was to attend school in a certain district. The Court
stated: A bona fide residence requirement, appropriately defined and uniformly applied
... does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It does
not burden or penalize the constitutional right of interstate travel, for any person is free
to move to a State and to establish residence there. Id. at 328-29. See also Sturgis v.
Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash.) (bona fide residence requirement for resi-
dent tuition rates at the University of Washington upheld) aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1057
(1973); Stains v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970) (bona fide residence
requirement for resident tuition rates at the University of Minnesota upheld), aff'd
mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
168. J. NOWAK, supra note 133, at 812. Professor Nowak cited Justice Douglas'
concurring opinion in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County. Id.
169. 727 F.2d at 638.
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Rather, the ordinance prohibited three groups from possessing hand-
guns: residents who moved to Chicago after the effective date of April
10, 1982; residents of Chicago on the effective date who did not own a
handgun; and residents of Chicago who owned a handgun on the effec-
tive date, but who did not register it with the city. 170 The court con-
cluded that the handgun provisions amounted to a "familiar
grandfather clause" 171 that had only an indirect effect on the right to
travel because new residents were merely one group among several
who did not benefit from the ordinance. 17
2
Governments use grandfather provisions to protect reliance interests
of established residents or businesses. 173 Courts, however, must scruti-
nize such provisions to determine whether they substitute for invidious
discrimination or interfere with a fundamental constitiutional right. 174
The Chicago ordinance did not contain a suspect classification or di-
170. Id. The court also noted that the ordinance limited the rights of gun owners
who satisfied the ordinance's requirements. Id. The law prevented owners from selling
or giving away their guns in Chicago, or replacing any handgun lost or destroyed. Id.
The court stated that the "ordinance thus effectively freezes the current distribution of
legal handguns in Chicago." Id.
171. Id. at 639. See generally Annotation, Construction of 'grandfather clause" of
statute or ordinance regulating or licensing business or occupation, 4 A.L.R.2d 667
(1949).
172. 727 F.2d at 639. See also Wine & Spirits Merchandisers, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor
Control Comm'n, 104 Ill. App. 3d 377 (1982). The court sustained the Illinois Liquor
Control Commission's decision not to renew certain distribution licenses held by the
merchants because it did not meet the requirements of a state grandfather provision. In
describing the function of grandfather provisions, the court stated that they permit the
continuation of otherwise illegal activity in order to obviate unfairness to those who
engaged in that activity before it was outlawed by the legislature. Id. at 379. The court
also stated that because grandfather provisions create an exception to the general provi-
sions of the statute, these clauses must be strictly construed. Id.
173. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). New Orleans enacted
an ordinance prohibiting pushcart vendors from selling foodstuffs in the French Quar-
ter. The Court sustained an amendment to the ordinance exempting vendors who had
continually operated the same business within the French Quarter for eight years prior
to the law's enforcement. Id. at 304-05. See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981). The Clover Leaf Court relied on Dukes to uphold the validity
of a state grandfather provision that temporarily protected reliance interests of estab-
lished businesses, but not the interest of more recent entries into the field. Id. at 467-68.
See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 809 (1978)
(FCC grandfather provision permitting certain existing newspaper-broadcaster combi-
nations to continue while requiring future diversification of ownership upheld); Trafelet
v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 630-31 & n. 11 (7th Cir. 1979) (protection of reliance inter-
ests in judicial retirement benefits is a legitimate goal for a state grandfather provision).
174. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275-77 (1939) (grandfather clause in state
voter registration law violated fifteenth amendment); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
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rectly burden a fundamental right. The court of appeals, therefore,
used the rational basis test rather than strict scrutiny to review the
ordinance. 175 The court found the city council's purposes, as set forth
in the ordinance's preamble, to be legitimate. In addition, the ordi-
nance was rationally related to achieving the goal of reducing Chi-
cago's handgun supply.
176
VIII. SIGNIFICANCE OF QUILICI AND SKLAR
Both Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove and Sklar v. Byrne support
the efforts of gun control lobbyists. The Quilici decision pointed out
that the Constitution's second amendment does not apply to state or
municipal governments. In addition, the court in Quilici asserted that
the second amendment protects only a collective right to bear arms
designed to maintain and preserve a well-regulated state militia. The
court also determined that section 22 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution
was no barrier to state regulation of firearms. Although section 22
guarantees an individual right to bear "arms," state police powers ex-
pressly limit this right, enabling local governments to regulate or ban
certain categories of firearms. Furthermore, the court held that an or-
dinance banning handgun possession was not an unconstitutional tak-
ing of private property under the fifth amendment. The Seventh
347, 364-65 (1915) (grandfather clause in state constitutional amendment violated fif-
teenth amendment).
175. Sklar, 727 F.2d 633, 639-40. See Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303. See supra note 157
for discussion of differing "tiers" of equal protection review.
176. 727 F.2d at 640. Petitioner's final two arguments concerned the particular
classification scheme that the city council chose to achieve its legitimate legislative
goals. The petitioner asserted that the grandfather clause served no legitimate purpose.
Id. at 641. Neither the ordinance nor the legislative record indicated the grandfather
clause's purpose. Id. The court, however, found it "clear" that the purpose of the
classification scheme was to protect the reliance interests of those who purchased hand-
guns legally before the effective date of the ordinance. Id. Citing Dukes and Clover
Leaf, the court held that protection of reliance interests was legitimate and that the
grandfather clause was tailored to fit the extent of the reliance. 727 F.2d at 642.
Petitioner's second contention was that the classification scheme was arbitrary and
irrational. Id. Petitioner argued that the scheme was inconsistent with the goal of the
ordinance. Id. If the city's goal was prevention of deaths and injuries resulting from
handguns, petitioner argued, it should classify people by their ability to handle guns.
Id. The court rejected this argument by stating that the Constitution did not require
Chicago to produce a "perfect law" and that the city council could proceed in eradicat-
ing a problem "step by step." Id. See also Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303; Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S.
106, 110 (1949).
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Circuit also determined that the ninth amendment did not create a fun-
damental right to possess firearms.
In Sklar the Seventh Circuit relied on its Quilici decision to dismiss
petitioner's second amendment and section 22 right to bear arms argu-
ments. The Chicago registration ordinance, however, had an equal
protection hurdle to clear that was not present in Quilici. In Sklar the
court determined that the ordinance was not a durational residence
requirement and that the ordinance's effect on travel was only indirect.
The Sklar decision held that use of a "grandfather clause" by the city
council to protect a citizen's reliance interests did not discriminate
against new residents, as they were merely one group among many that
did not benefit from the clause.
IX. ALTERNATIVE MODELS
The ordinances at issue in Sklar and Quilici provide alternative mod-
els for communities contemplating enactment of gun control legisla-
tion. Chicago's ordinance, upheld in Sklar froze the distribution of
handguns in the city at the level existing on the statute's effective date.
Alternatively, the ordinances of Morton Grove, Oak Park, and Evans-
ton banned private possession of handguns to differing degrees. Both
alternatives present viable means to reduce handgun-related accidents.
Before adopting either model ordinance, however, a local commu-
nity must satisfy various procedural requirements. Regardless of a mu-
nicipality's form of government,177 meetings of the city legislative body
discussing such an ordinance must be open to the public.17 The mu-
nicipality must give public notice of all regular and special meetings. 179
If a municipality does not comply with the open meeting requirement,
a court may declare null and void any final action taken at such a
meeting. 180
Both model ordinances should contain certain provisions that will
prevent facial invalidation of the statute. The ordinance should estab-
lish that the municipality has the requisite home rule authority.' In
177. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, %I 4-1-2,4-2-1,4-5-12 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
24, 11 5-1-1, 5-3-2 (1985) ("managerial" form of government); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,
6-1-1, 6-2-1, 6-4-2 (1985) ("strong mayor" form of government).
178. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, 1 42 (1985); see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, 1 4-5-
12.
179. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 102, 42.02.
180. Id. % 43(c).
181. See supra notes 82-128 and accompanying text (discussing municipal home
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addition, the ordinance should clearly state that the municipality's ac-
tions pertain to its "government and affairs" such as public health,
safety, and welfare.182
Both ordinance models should have a "construction" clause and a
"severability" clause. The construction clause establishes that the ordi-
nance supplements rather than supercedes state statutes. 183 Such a
clause prevents invalidation of the ordinance on state preemption
grounds.1 84 The severability clause provides that any invalid provision
in the ordinance shall not affect the remainder of the statute.
185
In addition, both types of ordinances need to define terms and estab-
lish penalties. The Morton Grove and Evanston gun control ordi-
nances have the most detailed definition of "firearm." 18 6  These
ordinances define "handgun" by manner of use (one hand), length of
barrel, and concealability of the weapon."8 ' Other important terms
that an ordinance must define include: "ammunition,"'18 8 "gun
club,"' 189 "gun dealer," 1" and "firearm collector." 19 1 Finally, the mu-
nicipality should establish penalties for violation of the ordinance. The
Illinois Constitution prohibits home rule units from defining and pro-
viding for punishment of a felony.1 92 Thus, a person violating a local
rule powers). See, eg., Evanston, Ill., Ordinance 22-0-82 (Oct. 4, 1982) (preamble)
[hereinafter Evanston].
182. See supra notes 89-92, 109 and accompanying texts (discussing municipal ac-
tions for the public welfare). See, eg., Oak Park, Ill., Ordinance Regulating the Posses-
sion of Firearms Commonly Known as Handguns (Apr. 16, 1984) (preamble)
[hereinafter Oak Park]; Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-11 (1981) (preamble) [herein-
after Morton Grove].
183. See, e.g., Evanston, supra note 181, § 1:9-8-13; Oak Park, supra note 182,
§ 2:27-5-1.
184. See supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
185. See, eg., CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 11.1-24 (1983); Evanston, supra note 181,
§ 1:9-8-15; Oak Park, supra note 182, § 2:27-5-3.
186. See, e.g., Evanston, supra note 181, § 1:9-8-1; Morton Grove, supra note 182,
§ 2:132:102(A).
187. Id.
188. See, eg., CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 11:1-1(a); Evanston, supra note 181, § 1:9-8-
1; Oak Park, supra note 182, § 2:27-1-1.
189. See, e.g., Evanston, supra note 181, § 1:9-8-1; Morton Grove, supra note 182,
§ 2:132.102(A); Oak Park, supra note 182, § 2:27-1-1.
190. See, e.g., id.
191. See, e.g., id.
192. ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 6(d).
1987)
Washington University Open Scholarship
370 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 31:341
gun control ordinance can be guilty of only a misdemeanor' 93 under
local law, although he may be subject to felony prosecution under state
law.1
94
Municipal enactment of either model creates difficulties. As stated
previously, the Chicago ordinance in Sklar froze possession of hand-
guns in the city to the level existing on the statute's effective date. A
government that enacts such an ordinance states, in effect, "so much
and no more."'195 This type of ordinance permits continued handgun
possession by those residents conforming to statutory requirements.
Consequently, enactment of this model creates less political contro-
versy because present citizens may retain possession of their handguns.
This handgun regulation model, however, creates potential four-
teenth amendment equal protection problems. If a government per-
mits all municipal residents to own handguns on the effective date of
the ordinance and disallows handgun possession by all persons moving
to the municipality after the effective date, it is unlikely that the ordi-
nance would survive a fourteenth amendment challenge. Drafters can
avoid equal protection objections by formulating an ordinance that af-
fects all residents of the municipality, including those residing in the
city both before and after the effective date of the statute.' 96 In this
manner, the ordinance does not single out new residents for different
treatment.
A municipality can also avoid equal protection challenges by ban-
ning private possession of handguns, like Morton Grove, Oak Park,
and Evanston. The second amendment and section 22 present hurdles
to this gun control model, but Kalodimos and Quilici decisions enable
local governments to clear these constitutional obstacles. A municipal-
ity could face more difficulty, however, enacting an ordinance that bans
all handgun possession. Such an ordinance polarizes a community
more than a Chicago-type regulation because it prohibits both new and
current residents from possessing handguns.
A local community that decides to ban private possession of hand-
guns can lessen this polarization by formulating its ordinance to permit
some continued use of private handguns. Both Morton Grove and Oak
Park permit their citizens to store and use handguns at licensed gun
193. Id.
194. See supra note 118 (discussing Illinois state firearm statutes).
195. Sklar v. Byrne, 727 F.2d at 639.
196. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 11.1-2.
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clubs. 197 Evanston originally prohibited private possession of hand-
guns,' 98 but following an amendment to its ordinance, the city now
permits registered members of the Chicago and Evanston Gun Clubs to
possess handguns within their residences or places of employment.' 99
If a municipality permits gun club members to retain handguns, it does
not decrease the potentiality of handgun-related deaths and injuries to
the extent that a total ban of home handgun possession would. To
further reduce handgun-related accidents, a municipality could either
prohibit firearm dealers' 00 or issue licenses to qualified applicants.01
With the latter, the ordinance then would require a dealer to report
each sale or gun rental to the police. 2 To encourage persons to turn
in their weapons voluntarily in a Morton Grove-type jurisdiction, the
ordinance should permit delivery of a weapon to the police department
without requiring those persons to provide identification, photographs,
or fingerprints.20 3 In addition, the ordinance could provide for a wait-
ing period before destroying the guns."° If the ordinance is repealed,
the municipality can then return the weapons.
X. CONCLUSION
Local gun control legislation is one of today's most controversial
political issues. Both the Chicago and the Morton Grove-Oak Park-
Evanston gun control models have strengths and weaknesses. After
Quilici and Sklar, however, a state or federal court in Illinois should
sustain a carefully drafted ordinance enacted by a municipality acting
pursuant to its home rule police powers. In Illinois, gun control advo-
197. See, e.g., Morton Grove, supra note 182, § 2:132.102(D)(7); Oak Park, supra
note 182, § 2:27-2-1(G).
198. See Evanston, supra note 181, § 1:9-8-2(B).
199. Id. § 1:9-8-8(D)(7).
200. See, e.g., id. § 1:9-8-4.
201. See, e.g., Oak Park, supra note 182, § 2:27-1-5.
202. See, eg., id. § 2:27-1-6(A)-(G). This ordinance requires firearm dealers to re-
port the name, address, and occupation of the buyer or renter; the date, price, and
purpose of the purchase or rental; evidence of authorization to acquire a gun; and the
kind, description, and serial number of the firearm. Id.
203. See, e.g., Evanston, supra note 181, § 1:9-8-10; Oak Park, supra note 182,
§ 2:27-4-2.
204. See, e.g., Oak Park, supra note 182, § 2:27-4-3.
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cates have won the legal battle, but whether they will have continued
success in the political arena remains unclear.
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* J.D. 1986, Washington University.
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